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Rule versus Discretion: Regulatory Uncertainty,
Firm Investment, and Bureaucratic Organization
B. Pablo Montagnes, Emory University
Stephane Wolton, London School of EconomicsAs markets evolve, new regulatory concerns emerge. In response, policy makers institute new requirements for private
businesses. Because they impose costs and generate uncertainty, these requirements may deter ﬁrm investment. To reduce
regulatory uncertainty and favor investment, a principal can choose a rule-based regulatory framework. However, unlike
discretion, rules do not adapt to circumstances and are thus inefﬁcient. Using a micro-founded model, we uncover
circumstances under which the ex ante certainty provided by a rule dominates the ex post efﬁciency provided by delegation
to an unbiased agent. We also establish when delegating to a biased agent is optimal for a policy maker. Our main results
highlight that the anticipated economic responses of ﬁrms can indirectly inﬂuence the organization of the bureaucracy.
As such, any attempt to evaluate ﬁrms’ direct inﬂuence in the rule-making process—through lobbying or information
disclosure—needs to establish the proper counterfactual that accounts for the indirect effects this article identiﬁes.As technology evolves, industries adapt and new mar-kets emerge, generating previously unknown regula-tory concerns. In response, policy makers create bu-
reaus and agencies and impose new requirements on private
businesses. This process of technological evolution and reg-
ulatory adaptation generates uncertainty for ﬁrms as chang-
ing regulations impose costs and affect the structure of the
market.1 As has been stressed in a large business and eco-
nomics literature, regulatory uncertainty can discourage ﬁrm
investment and, as a result, depress economic growth and
social welfare (see Hoffmann, Trautmann, and Hamprecht
2009;Milliken 1987; Pindyck 1991). Lloyd Blankfein, theCEO
of Goldman Sachs, addressed this issue when discussing the
domestic gas industry in an interview on CNBC on June 11,
2014: “We have to resolve some of the uncertainties. . . .
Without stable regulation, without an agreement and a com-
promise, an accommodation between the forces that are fo-
cused on the environment and those that are focused on jobs
and growth, we’ve managed to do a lot of production of en-B. Pablo Montagnes (pablo.montagnes@emory.edu) is an assistant professor at t
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build the downstream plants that create the manufacturing
and the jobs.”
In this article, we examine how the downstream economic
consequences of regulatory uncertainty shape the organization
of the bureaucracy (the regulatory framework and the pref-
erences of agents in charge of it). To reduce regulatory un-
certainty and encourage investment, a policy maker (hence-
forth, principal) can choose a rule-based regulatory framework
that establishes clear and unchanging standards. But rules
do not adapt to circumstances and, unlike a discretion-based
regulatory framework, lead to ex post inefﬁcient regulation. A
principal who cares about the private (consumer surplus and
proﬁt) and social (externality) impact of ﬁrm investment faces
a trade-off between ex ante certainty and ex post efﬁciency.
Using a micro-founded model, we establish the circumstances
under which a principal prefers an inefﬁcient rule.
In our baseline setup, a ﬁrm must decide whether to pay
a cost to enter and be a monopolist provider in a new mar-he Department of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322
t of Government, London School of Economics, London, UK WC2A 2AE
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3. When the marginal cost of production increases at an increasing
rate with the level of regulation, production decreases at a constantly
increasing rate. The marginal beneﬁt of regulation then decreases at an
increasing rate since the degree of externality left unmitigated becomes
smaller and quantities produced decrease quickly. The marginal cost of
regulation, in turn, increases at an increasing rate as proﬁt and consumer
surplus decrease at an increasing rate. The combination of these effects
implies that the regulatory burden imposed on the ﬁrm is concave.
458 / Rule versus Discretion B. Pablo Montagnes and Stephane Woltonket.2 Production in this new market generates a per-unit
externality—henceforth, “degree of externality” or state of
the world—that is initially unknown to all actors but is
revealed after the ﬁrm’s investment. Regulation takes the
form of requirements that mitigate the negative impact of the
externality. Examples include treatment of waste water for
the fracking industry, safety standards for automobiles, per-
missible emission levels of air pollutants for various indus-
tries, and accessibility requirements in the housing code. If
regulation were costless for ﬁrms, the problem would be
trivial: the principal would require full mitigation, and there
would be no uncertainty. In many cases, however, regulatory
requirements increase a ﬁrm’s production cost (additional
investment on fracking sites or production plants, additional
features on automobiles, etc.) and thus reduce production,
ﬁrm proﬁt, and consumer surplus. When choosing the level
of regulation, the principal must then balance the beneﬁt of
mitigation against these distortionary costs.
For a low degree of externality, the loss associated with
the externality is limited, whereas the distortionary effects of
regulation are bounded away from zero. Consequently, the
principal always prefers to impose no regulation. If pos-
sible, she would even choose a “negative” level of regulation.
Equilibrium regulation thus differs from the (unconstrained)
ﬁrst-best whenever there is a ﬂoor on the feasible level of
regulation. Limits on regulation, which are critical for our
analysis, are relatively common. They can arise as a result of
technical constraints. For example, laws governing reporting
can do no less than require no disclosure. Safety and envi-
ronmental regulation cannot mandate that products become
more dangerous or ﬁrms pollutemore. Such regulations would
constitute a requirement and increase ﬁrm costs. In a sim-
ilar vein, the National Highway Trafﬁc Safety Administration
can initiate recalls of an unsafe car model, order modiﬁca-
tions, and impose safety standards but cannot reward com-
panies that exceed its standards. Lower bounds on regulation
may also result from the structure of the government. State
regulators are constrained by federal regulation in the United
States. Nation states are also constrained by treaties or su-
pranational entities like the European Union. These upper
levels of government often impose minimum standards of
regulation (e.g., the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts in the
United States and Health and Safety at Work Framework
Directive in the European Union) on lower levels.
When the degree of externality is relatively large, the lower
bound on regulation no longer binds since the principal al-
ways chooses a strictly positive level of regulation, increas-2. Our key insights hold when there are multiple potential entrants.
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strength of its distortionary effects, the level of regulation can
be more or less responsive to the degree of externality. It is
concave whenever the marginal cost of regulation increases
at a high rate (as a result of, e.g., an ever-increasing marginal
cost of production).3
While the previous analysis considers the optimal level of
regulation as a function of the degree of externality, the state
of the world is revealed only after the ﬁrm invests. Under a
rule-based framework, the principal chooses a level of reg-
ulation as a function of her prior belief about the possible
degrees of externality. Under what we refer to as “unbiased
discretion,” the principal, via delegation to an agent who
shares her preferences, tailors the level of regulation to the
realized state of the world.4 When all possible degrees of
externality are relatively large, the principal always prefers a
positive level of regulation, and the ﬁrm faces uncertainty
about how much it will be regulated. When there is a posi-
tive probability that the principal chooses no regulation, the
ﬁrm faces uncertainty about whether it will be regulated.
These different types of uncertainty have implications for the
principal’s choice between rule and discretion.
When uncertainty is about how much the ﬁrm will be
regulated, unbiased discretion dominates a rule whenever
the level of regulation is concave, and the resulting ﬁrm’s
proﬁt (conditional on investment) is convex in the degree of
externality. The average level of regulation between realized
states is then always strictly lower than the level of regulation
in the average state. Consequently, the ﬁrm’s expected reg-
ulatory burden is strictly lower and the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt
strictly higher under delegation to an unbiased agent than
under a rule. When regulatory uncertainty is about how
much a ﬁrm is regulated, unbiased discretion not only is ex
post efﬁcient but also can be more favorable to ﬁrm invest-
ment than a rule.
In contrast, when uncertainty is about whether the ﬁrm
will be regulated, a rule can dominate delegation to an unbi-
ased agent. Under unbiased discretion, the agent “overregu-4. We use the terms “discretion” and “delegation” interchangeably in
our model as delegation grants the agent full autonomy to set policy. As
such, our article studies the principal’s choice whether to retain or delegate
decision power to an agent.
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Volume 79 Number 2 April 2017 / 459lates” when the degree of externality is low. Because the agent
is optimally responding to circumstances, he cannot commit
to compensating for the overregulation in states with a low
degree of externality by underregulating in states with a high
degree of externality. Under a rule, the principal can choose
an average level of regulation that takes into account the
cost of overregulation for low degrees of externality. Con-
sequently, regulation under a rule can be strictly lower than
the average regulation under unbiased discretion, leading to
greater proﬁt and a higher likelihood of investment.When the
cost of investment is likely to be high—meaning the proba-
bility of investment under unbiased discretion is low—the
principal prefers a rule and its associated regulatory certainty
over discretion and its associated ex post efﬁciency.
A principal may refrain from delegating to an unbiased
agent in order to gain ex ante commitment power when un-
certainty is about whether the ﬁrm will be regulated. In these
circumstances, however, she generally prefers delegation to
an agent sufﬁciently biased in favor of business (i.e., who
weights the ﬁrm’s proﬁt in his decision sufﬁciently more than
the principal) to a rule-based regulatory framework. A pro-
business agent chooses the same (null) level of regulation as
the principal when the degree of externality is low. When the
degree of externality is high, he underregulates compared to
the principal. However, the level of regulation is closer to
the principal’s preferred level than under the rule while still
generating investment by the ﬁrm with high probability. Con-
sequently, delegating to a biased agent gives ex ante commit-
ment power to the principal while recovering some of the ex
post efﬁciency, and the principal is necessarily better off. Our
model thus predicts that more preference divergence between
the principal and an agent can lead to more discretion.
Delegation to a biased agent, however, supposes that the
principal can commit not to replace the agent with some-
one whose preferences are closer to her own once the ﬁrm
investment has been realized and the degree of externality
has been revealed to all. As the expected cost of investment
increases, to encourage ﬁrm investment, the principal must
delegate to an increasingly biased agent. This agent chooses
a level of regulation further away from the principal’s ideal
whenever the degree of externality is high. In the absence
of a high cost of replacing the agent, the principal may not
be able to credibly commit to retaining the biased agent and
may be unable to do better than a suboptimal rule. As such,
our article provides an additional justiﬁcation for civil service
protection distinct from the need to encourage the acquisition
of expertise (as in, among others, Gailmard and Patty [2007,
2012b]).
Importantly, our key result that a rule can dominate un-
biased discretion when there is uncertainty about whetherThis content downloaded from 158.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms the ﬁrm will be regulated still holds when the set of available
policy instruments includes a subsidy. A subsidy encourages
more production and therefore bears some similarity to a
negative level of regulation. It is, however, not equivalent.
The cost for the principal of negative regulation (if feasible)
depends on the degree of externality and thus goes to zero as
the degree of externality goes to zero. In turn, a subsidy must
be ﬁnanced through taxation, which generates costly distor-
tions in other markets. The cost of a subsidy, therefore, does
not vary with the degree of externality. As a result, the prin-
cipal cannot reproduce the ﬁrst-best unconstrained negative
level of regulation with a subsidy. A rule can still lead to
greater proﬁt and a greater likelihood of ﬁrm investment and
thus be preferred to unbiased discretion.
This article highlights a fundamental trade-off governing
the choice between a rule and discretion, distinct from con-
cerns related to political control (Epstein andO’Halloran 1994)
or information acquisition (Gailmard and Patty 2012b).While
discretion allows for the possibility of ex post efﬁciency, it
also introduces regulatory uncertainty. The resolution of this
trade-off depends critically on the strategic behavior of reg-
ulated ﬁrms. Thus, quite apart from channels of direct in-
ﬂuence (lobbying or information disclosure), ﬁrms can have
signiﬁcant indirect inﬂuence on the internal organization of
the bureaucracy. Further, the choices of a principal who antic-
ipates the downstream economic consequences of regulatory
uncertainty are not uniform; the optimal structure of the bu-
reaucracymay, for example, vary with the nature of regulatory
uncertainty. As such, any attempt to assess the direct inﬂuence
of ﬁrms on the rule-making process needs to establish the
proper counterfactual that accounts for the indirect effects
identiﬁed in our article.
LITERATURE
A large literature studies internal bureaucratic problems in-
herent to delegation, namely, the relationship between a prin-
cipal and a bureaucratic agent (see Gailmard and Patty [2012a]
for a review). In the presence of costless information acqui-
sition, the primary ﬁnding from this literature is the ally prin-
ciple: Whenever possible, the principal chooses “an ideo-
logical clone of one’s self as one’s agent” (Gailmard and Patty
2012b, 5). She also grants more discretion when the agent’s
preferences are closer to her own (Epstein and O’Halloran
1994), when uncertainty is high (Bendor, Glazer, and Ham-
mond 2001; Gailmard and Patty 2012a; Moe 2012), or when
she wants to encourage the acquisition of expertise (Gailmard
and Patty 2007).
In contrast, our article focuses on the impact of the reg-
ulatory framework on regulated actors, such as ﬁrms. Like
Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty (2006), Gailmard and Patty43.197.008 on May 16, 2017 03:38:09 AM
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strategic behavior, a principal may choose to limit discre-
tion to an unbiased agent or delegate to a pro-business one.5
There are, however, two critical differences. In previous work,
delegating to a biased agent is meant to prevent a ﬁrm’s op-
portunism in information transmission through either the
retention of policy-relevant information (Boehmke et al. 2006;
Gailmard and Patty 2012b) or underinvestment in expertise
(McCarty 2013).6 We abstract away from informational con-
cerns and instead consider the role of regulatory uncertainty
on ﬁrm investment. Second, we do so in a micro-founded
model that considers the downstream economic consequences
of regulation.
Closest to the present work is the central bank literature.7
A well-known result in this literature is that politicians can
be better off appointing conservative central bankers who
care about inﬂation more than they do in order to gain
commitment power. Furthermore, as in our article, this lit-
erature shows that rules can lead to a more socially beneﬁcial
outcome than delegation to a welfare-maximizing central
banker (Athey, Atkeson, and Kehoe 2005). Our analysis, how-
ever, differs in three important aspects. First, in the central
bank literature, a politician faces a commitment problem only
because he is self-interested (e.g., seeking reelection), whereas
here, the principal might prefer to appoint a biased agent even
if she shares the exact same preference as an unmodeled me-
dian voter. Second, while the principal’s commitment prob-
lem arises because of exogenous shocks in the central bank
literature, it is endogenous to ﬁrms’ strategic behavior in our
article. Finally, the present work highlights that the nature of
the regulatory uncertainty can play a central role in the in-
ternal organization of the bureaucracy. This aspect of the
problem cannot be foreseen from the central bank literature
because of its focus on exogenous shocks.5. Several other studies have also shown that the ally principle fails to
hold when the principal needs to provide incentives for the bureaucratic
agent to collect information (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004; Dewatripont
and Tirole 1999) or to credibly reveal his private information (Gailmard
and Patty 2013).
6. A few other papers examine how information provision by regu-
lated actors affects the internal organization of the bureaucracy. Laffont
and Tirole (1993) show that to encourage information transmission, a
principal may prefer to impose limits on possible regulation, which is akin
to restricting discretion. Gordon and Hafer (2007) analyze how politicians
choose a regulatory framework to maximize ﬁrms’ contributions when
only ﬁrms have information about the impact of regulation. Carpenter
and Ting (2007) show that the regulatory stance and the behavior of ﬁrms
are self-reinforcing: more skeptical regulators lead to more provision of
information by regulated ﬁrms.
7. Our article can also be related to the idea that patents are essential
for ﬁrms’ investment in research and development.
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In this section, we present a micro-founded model that il-
lustrates how the organization of the bureaucracy depends
on the strategic interactions between the principal, her bu-
reaucratic agent, and regulated ﬁrms.
A ﬁrm decides whether to enter a new market. Entry
requires an irreversible, ﬁxed cost of investment C ≥ 0. The
cost of investment is initially unknown to all and becomes
observable only after the regulatory environment is in place.
It is common knowledge that C is distributed over the interval
½C ,C , with 0 ≤ C ≤ C, according to some cumulative dis-
tribution function F(⋅).8 If the ﬁrm does not enter, its proﬁt is
0. The ﬁrm thus enters the market if and only if the expected
proﬁt conditional on entry exceeds the cost of investment
C. If the ﬁrm enters, it becomes a monopoly provider facing
linear consumer demand:9
D(p)p 12 kp, ð1Þ
where p denotes the price charged by the ﬁrm and the pa-
rameter k determines the slope of the demand curve. The
ﬁrm’s proﬁt also depends on the level of regulation R∈ [0, 1],
which affects the costs of production of Q units of the good:
c(Q;R)p Q2=(12 R). The ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is
P(Q;R)p pQ2
Q2
12 R
: ð2Þ
Production in the new market generates a per-unit de-
gree of externality S, which (for ease of exposition) takes
one of two valuesfS, Sg.10 The realized degree of externality is
unknown before the ﬁrm investment but is revealed to all
players after investment is realized. It is common knowledge
that the level of externality is low (Sp S) with probability
q. We assume that regulation has a direct positive effect in
the sense that requirements do (partially) reduce the harm
associated with the externality. Put differently, rather than
simply being a burden and increasing ﬁrm production cost,
regulation is also assumed to improve the social value asso-
ciated with production. Regulations that both mitigate harm
and increase costs are common. Examples include safety fea-
tures for products (air bags and crash standards for cars,
nonﬂammable children’s clothing standards), ﬁre and acces-
sibility codes for buildings, scrubbers that reduce air pollution
from power production, and waste water treatment require-8. The main thrust of our argument still holds if the cost of invest-
ment is deterministic, i.e., C p C.
9. We consider the case of multiple entrants in the extension section.
10. Our main results extend to any number of degrees of externality
and even to continuous distribution (see n. 15 for more details).
43.197.008 on May 16, 2017 03:38:09 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 79 Number 2 April 2017 / 461ments for industry. Each of these regulatory requirements in-
creases the cost of production but also reduces the negative
externalities associated with the product. Thus, when the level
of regulation is R, the social cost of the externality is equal to
(12 R)SQ.11
The principal cares about consumer surplus (CS(Q;R)),
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, and the total level of the externality. We pa-
rameterize the principal’s utility as a weighted sum
WP(R; S,aP)p aPCS(Q;R)1 (12 aP 2 g)P(Q;R)
2g(12 R)SQ:
ð3Þ
The parameter aP corresponds to the principal’s bias in
favor of consumers relative to business. We ﬁx g ∈ (0, ½) to
focus the analysis on the degree of bias toward consumers
or business interests.
The principal chooses a regulatory framework that ﬁrst
consists of a decision to establish a rule or to grant dis-
cretion to an agent (delegation). A rule is a ﬁxed level of
regulation imposed prior to the ﬁrm’s investment and the
realization of the degree of externality. Under discretion, the
agent chooses the level of regulation after the ﬁrm’s invest-
ment and can condition it on the revealed degree of exter-
nality. In addition, under discretion, the principal decides
to whom she delegates. That is, the principal may choose
an agent with a different bias in favor of consumers (i.e., aA
need not be equal to aP). The utility function of the agent
with bias aA is
WA(R; S,aA)p aACS(Q;R)1 (12 aA 2 g)P(Q;R)
2g(12 R)SQ:
ð4Þ
We say that an agent is unbiased if he shares the same
preference as the principal: aAp aP. We call an agent pro-
consumer if the agent weighs consumer surplus more than
the principal: aA 1 aP. In turn, we call an agent pro-business
if the agent weighs the ﬁrm’s proﬁt more than the principal:
aA ! aP. Table 1 summarizes the timing.
The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium, which requires that at each stage, a player (ﬁrm, agent,
or principal) maximizes her utility anticipating other players’
strategies at later node(s) of the game.11. The assumption that the level of regulation proportionally decreases
the negative effect of production is made both to increase the ﬁdelity of the
model to the actual real-world regulatory instruments that we are attempting
to capture and to make clear the direct and indirect effects of regulation.
Without an abatement effect (and even when regulation affects only the
production cost), the underlying logic of our main results would still hold, but
the details of a propositionwould change. In particular, in app. D, we consider
the case in which a tax serves as a regulatory instrument and show that our
main results carry through in this setting.
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following assumption related to the ﬁrm’s investment cost
and the principal’s preferred rule. Let the unconstrained rule
be the level of regulation that the principal would impose ex
ante assuming (possibly naively) that the ﬁrm always invests.
We assume that under this unconstrained rule, the ﬁrm does
in fact always invest (i.e., C is sufﬁciently low). We hence-
forth refer to the principal’s unconstrained rule as the welfare-
maximizing rule.12
RULES VERSUS UNBIASED DISCRETION
In this section, we restrict attention to a principal deciding
between a rule-based regulatory framework and delegation to
an unbiased agent or, equivalently, unbiased discretion. Even
though the principal and agent have the exact same prefer-
ences, we show that the principal may prefer to establish a rule
rather than to delegate since a rule acts as a commitment
device that resolves the regulatory uncertainty faced by the
ﬁrm and encourages investment.
We ﬁrst characterize the level of regulation as a function
of the degree of externality conditional on the ﬁrm entering
the market. If regulation was costless for the ﬁrm, full reg-
ulation would always be optimal. A greater level of regula-
tion, however, increases the cost of production, reducing the
quantity produced, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, and consumer surplus,
as illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
Under our assumptions, more regulation increases the
ﬁrm’s (marginal) cost at a constantly increasing rate. Con-
sequently, the level of production and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt de-
crease at a constantly increasing rate as the level of regula-
tion increases. This implies that as the level of regulation
increases, the marginal cost of regulation increases at a con-
stantly increasing rate.
Regulation, on the other hand, is beneﬁcial since it re-
duces the costs imposed by the externality. When the level of
regulation is low, a small proportion of the cost of externality
is mitigated, and production is high. Consequently, there is a
large beneﬁt to increasing the level of regulation. In turn,
when the level of regulation is high, a high proportion of
the cost of the externality is already mitigated and production
is low. Consequently, there is a small beneﬁt to increasing the
level of regulation.13 As such, holding ﬁxed the degree of ex-
ternality, as the level of regulation increases, the marginal12. Notice that under the welfare-maximizing rule, the principal is
always weakly better off when the ﬁrm invests. In the extension section, we
consider the case in which the principal may prefer to forestall investment.
13. Even though an increase in regulation has a greater negative effect
on production for high compared to low levels of regulation, the gain from
a signiﬁcant reduction in production is limited since a large portion of the
degree of externality is already mitigated.
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ingmarginal beneﬁt and increasingmarginal cost implies that
for any degree of externality, there exists a unique optimal
level of regulation.
For a low degree of externality, the marginal beneﬁt of reg-
ulation is extremely low, whereas the marginal cost is always
bounded away from zero since regulation reduces production,
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, and consumer surplus. Consequently, there
exists a strictly positive threshold bS(aP) such that whenever
the degree of externality S is lower than this threshold, the
optimal level of regulation is zero. When the degree of ex-
ternality is above this threshold (S 1 bS(aP)), a strictly positive
and strictly increasing level of regulation is optimal.
The optimal level of regulation displays another interest-
ing property with respect to the degree of externality. Since
regulation conveys decreasingmarginal beneﬁt and increasing
marginal cost,14 the optimal regulatory response associated
with an increase in the degree of externality is decreasing
with the degree of externality. That is, whenever S 1 bS(aP),
the optimal level of regulation is concave in the degree of
externality as illustrated in ﬁgure 2. Lemma 1 summarizes the
properties of the optimal level of regulation.
Lemma 1. There exists a unique level of regulation
(R*(S; aP)) for all degrees of externality. The relation-
ship between regulation and the degree of externality
exhibits the following properties:14.
of regu
at a co
concav
decreasi. There exists a unique and strictly positive degree
of externality, bS(aP) 1 0, such that the level of
regulation is zero for all degrees of externality
below bS(aP).In addition, the marginal cost of regulation is convex in the level
lation (since the production cost increases and production decreases
nstantly increasing rate) and the marginal beneﬁt of regulation is
e (since there is less externality left unmitigated and production
es as R increases).
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level of regulation is strictly positive, increasing,
and concave in S.Since regulation increases the ﬁrm’s production cost, the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt is inversely correlated with the level of regu-
lation. Consequently, for low degrees of externality (S ≤ bS),
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is constant since there is no regulation. For
high degrees of externality, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is decreasing in
the degree of externality. Since the level of regulation in-
creases at a decreasing rate with the degree of externality,
the cost imposed on the ﬁrm increases at a decreasing rate
with S. As a result, whenever the level of regulation is strictly
positive (equivalently, S 1 bS(aP)), the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is convex
in the degree of externality as illustrated in ﬁgure 3. This
convexity arises as a consequence of the regulatory response,
and not from a risk-seeking behavior by the ﬁrm.
Lemma 2. Conditional on entry, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
exhibits the following properties:i. For all degrees of externality below bS(aP), the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt is constant.
ii. For all degrees of externality above bS(aP), the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt is strictly decreasing and convex in S.The previous analysis characterizes the optimal level of
regulation for different degrees of externality. However, the
actual regulation faced by the ﬁrm depends on the regulatory
framework. Under a rule-based regulatory framework, the
level of regulation depends on the expectation of the degrees
of externality. Under unbiased discretion, if the ﬁrm invests,
the level of regulation depends on the realized degree of
externality (S or S). Thus, a rule is associated with regulatory
certainty for the ﬁrm, while delegation is associated with ex
post efﬁciency for the principal.
The ﬁrm, however, does not always value more regulatory
certainty. As ﬁgure 4 illustrates, when the level of regulationTable 11. Principal chooses either rule or granting discretion to an agent
If the principal chooses rule: If the principal grants discretion:
2. Principal chooses the level of regulation Rr ∈ ½0, 1,
observed by all
2. Principal chooses an agent with bias aA, observed by all3. The investment cost C is realized, and the ﬁrm
decides whether to enter the new market3. The investment cost C is realized, and the ﬁrm decides
whether to enter the new market4. If the ﬁrm enters the market, the externality is revealed 4. If the ﬁrm enters the market, the degree of externality
S ∈ fS, Sg is revealed, and the agent sets the level of regulation
Rd(S)5. Payoffs are realized 5. Payoffs are realized008 on May 16, 2017 03:38:09 AM
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16. Notice that even if S ! bS, unbiased discretion leads to greater
Volume 79 Number 2 April 2017 / 463is always positive (S ≥ bS(aP))—meaning the regulatory un-
certainty is about how much the ﬁrm will be regulated—the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt under unbiased discretion, denoted P(Disc;aP),
is higher than its proﬁt under the welfare-maximizing rule,
denoted P(Rule). Under unbiased discretion, the ﬁrm faces
a lottery over two outcomes: the levels of regulation and as-
sociated proﬁts when the degree of externality is low (S) and
high (S). Since the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is convex in this range, the
ﬁrm strictly prefers this lottery over the certain level of reg-
ulation based on the expected level of externality imposed by
the rule.15
In turn, when the optimal level of regulation in the low state
entails no regulation (S ! bS(aP))—meaning that the regula-
tory uncertainty is about whether the ﬁrm will be regulated—
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt can be strictly higher under the welfare-
maximizing rule. When the revealed degree of externality is
low, an unbiased agent would like to choose a negative level
of regulation. Since this is unfeasible, there is “overregulation”
in state Sp S. Under unbiased discretion, the agent opti-
mally responds to the revealed degree of externality in state
Sp S by choosing a high level of regulation and so cannot
compensate for overregulation in state Sp S. In contrast,
under the rule, the principal balances overregulation in the
low state (Sp S) and underregulation in the high state
(Sp S). Because of the heightened cost of overregulation in
the low state, the principal imposes a relatively lenient rule.
Consequently, the expected level of regulation can be strictly
lower and the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt strictly higher under the15. Observe that the logic described above applies to any ﬁnite
number of states as well as a continuous state variable.
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms welfare-maximizing rule than under unbiased discretion.
Such a case is illustrated in ﬁgure 5.16
Having examined the relationship between the regula-
tory framework and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, we now return to the
principal’s decision to enact a rule or to delegate to an
unbiased agent.
With delegation to an unbiased agent, the principal can
achieve ex post efﬁciency. When regulatory uncertainty is
about how much the ﬁrm will be regulated, discretion also
leads to higher expected proﬁt than the welfare-maximizing
rule, and the ﬁrm invests with probability one under both
regulatory frameworks. Thus, the principal strictly prefers
unbiased discretion since it is ex post efﬁcient and encourages
investment. In other words, the ally principle holds in full
when regulatory uncertainty centers around how much the
ﬁrm will be regulated.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the ﬁrm always faces a
strictly positive level of regulation (S ≥ bS(aP)). Then
the principal prefers unbiased discretion to the welfare-
maximizing rule.
The conclusion is different when regulatory uncertainty
instead is about whether the ﬁrm will be regulated. In this
environment, discretion leads to lower expected proﬁt thanFigure 1. Market equilibrium with different levels of regulation. A, Market equilibrium with no regulation. B, Market equilibrium with regulation. The light
shaded area below P*(·) corresponds to the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, the darker area above P*(·) to the consumer surplus, and the darkest area to the loss associated
with a positive level of regulation (R p 0.5). Parameter value: k p 1.expected proﬁt if the degree of externality in the high state (Sp S) is
sufﬁciently large and the high state is sufﬁciently likely to occur (q is
sufﬁciently low). See lemma A.4 in app. A for details. The analysis of this
case parallels the analysis of the case in which the level of regulation is
strictly positive in both states and is excluded from the text for brevity.
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464 / Rule versus Discretion B. Pablo Montagnes and Stephane Woltonthe welfare-maximizing rule. The principal then trades off ex
post efﬁciency for a lower ex ante probability of investment.
When the cost of investment is very likely to be high, so that
there is a low probability that the ﬁrm invests under unbiased
discretion, the principal prefers the welfare-maximizing rule
even at the expense of ex post efﬁcient regulation because the
rule gives the principal ex ante commitment power. In these
circumstances, the principal prefers to reduce the discretion
granted to an agent with preferences similar to her own: The
ally principle fails to hold.
Proposition 2. The principal prefers the welfare-
maximizing rule to unbiased discretion whenever the
following conditions are satisﬁed:i. the probability of investment under unbiased
discretion is sufﬁciently low,
ii. the lower degree of externality (S) is strictly less
than bS(aP), andThis content downloaded from 158.143.197.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Coiii. the upper degree of externality (S) is strictly
below some S(S;aP) 1 bS(aP).The case of the fracking industry in the United States il-
lustrates how investment can vary with the regulatory frame-
work. As in our setup, this industry requires large irreversible
investment and is marked by a high degree of uncertainty
about the environmental impact of fracking (e.g., effect on
aquifers and seismic activity). In response, states have chosen
different regulatory options. Some states, such as Texas and
North Dakota, have passed legislation guaranteeing no addi-
tional regulation above and beyond federal requirements—a
regulatory framework that arguably resembles a rule. In con-
trast, other states, such asOhio and Pennsylvania, have adopted
a wait-and-see approach, monitoring water and air quality
before making regulatory decisions—a regulatory framework
that arguably resembles discretion. While the ﬁrst set of states
has seen a boom in fracking, the second has experienced only
moderate growth. Our theoretical results suggest that theFigure 4. Proﬁt under different regulatory frameworks for high degrees of
externality. Parameter values: k p 1, aP p 0.3, g p 0.4, S p 0:25,
S p 1:25, and q p 0.5.Figure 5. Proﬁt under different regulatory frameworks for low degrees of
externality. Parameter values: k p 1, aP p 0.3, g p 0.4, S p 0:01,
S p 0:525, and q p 0.5.Figure 3. Firm proﬁt as a function of the degree of externality. Parameter
values: k p 1, aP p 0.3, and g p 0.4.Figure 2. Level of regulation as a function of the degree of externality.
Parameter values: k p 1, aP p 0.3, and g p 0.4.008 on May 16, 2017 03:38:09 AM
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Volume 79 Number 2 April 2017 / 465regulatory framework is probably one of the many factors
explaining this difference.
This section establishes that the principal prefers unbiased
discretion to the welfare-maximizing rule when uncertainty
is about how much the ﬁrm will be regulated, whereas the
reverse may hold true when uncertainty is about whether
the ﬁrm will be regulated. This clear distinction arises when-
ever the level of regulation is concave and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is
convex in S for S 1 bS(aP), which is guaranteed by our func-
tional form assumptions. When, in some range, the level of
regulation is convex and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt concave in S, proﬁt
is higher under the welfare-maximizing rule than under
unbiased discretion.17 Even though the uncertainty is about
how much regulation, the principal chooses a rule-based
regulatory framework over unbiased discretion whenever the
cost of investment is likely to be high. In contrast, the prin-
cipal’s preference for the welfare-maximizing rule under the
conditions of proposition 2 results from the existence of a
binding ﬂoor on the level of regulation—due to technical
constraints or the structure of government—and holds as
long as regulation increases themarginal cost of production.18
When our functional form assumptions are relaxed, the
welfare-maximizing rule may therefore dominate unbiased
discretion when regulatory uncertainty is about whether and
how much the ﬁrm will be regulated.
OPTIMAL BIASED DELEGATION
In the previous section, we assumed that the principal can
delegate only to an unbiased agent, that is, an agent who
shares her preferences. Now, we enrich the set of possible
delegates and show that given freedom to choose agents of
any bias, a principal generally does better under discretion
than under a rule.
This result holds trivially when the regulatory uncer-
tainty is about how much the ﬁrm will be regulated since the17. We establish sufﬁcient conditions for a convex level of regulation
and concave proﬁt in app. C.
18. A general condition for the existence of bS is
dWP(R; S,aP)
dR

Rp0,Sp0
! 0:
Some algebra yields
dWP(R; S,aP)
dR

Rp0,Sp0
p aP
∂Q
∂R

Rp0
∂CS(Q; 0)
∂Q
1(12 aP 2 g)
∂P(Q;R)
∂R

Rp0
(since ∂P(Q;R)=∂Qp 0). Since dCS(Q; 0)=dQ 1 0, dWP(R; S,aP)=
dRjRp0,Sp0 ! 0 holds as long as regulation increases the marginal cost of
production, so ∂Q=∂R ! 0 and ∂P(Q;R)=∂R ! 0.
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This type of delegation has no effect on the probability of
investment by the ﬁrm and leads to ex post efﬁcient regu-
lation for the principal.19
When regulatory uncertainty is about whether the ﬁrm
will be regulated, the welfare-maximizing rule can do better
than delegation to an unbiased agent as it guarantees a higher
proﬁt to the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt is also relatively high when
the principal delegates to a pro-business agent who weighs
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt more and thus regulates less than an unbiased
agent (see ﬁg. 6 for an illustration).
Suppose that by delegating to an appropriately pro-business
agent (which we refer to as biased discretion) the principal
can guarantee a proﬁt as high as under the welfare-maximizing
rule.20 The ﬁrm then invests with probability one. Further-
more, whenever the rule leads to a strictly positive level of
regulation, the principal is strictly better off with biased dele-
gation. In the low state (Sp S), she achieves her ﬁrst-best
level of regulation and in the high state (Sp S), the level of
regulation, while lower than her ﬁrst-best, is strictly higher
than the welfare-maximizing rule.21 Figure 7 illustrates this
result, and proposition 3 formally states it.
Proposition 3. The principal prefers biased discre-
tion to the welfare-maximizing rule and to unbiased
discretion if conditions i and ii described in propo-
sition 2 hold and, in addition,19.
20.
regulat
and so
essarily
21.
ﬁrm’s
better
princip
22.
compat
43.197.
and Coiii. the upper degree of externality (S) is less than
bS(0), and
iv. the agent is moderately pro-business.Under the conditions of proposition 3, the principal pre-
fers to delegate to a pro-business rather than an unbiased agent.
By doing so, she gains some of the ex ante commitment power
of the rule (which increases the probability that the ﬁrm in-
vests compared to unbiased discretion) and recovers some
of the ex post efﬁciency of delegation to an unbiased agent
(given investment).22 As such, it is difﬁcult to recover a prin-This result also holds for the case described in n. 16.
This is feasible unless S is very large. In this case, the level of
ion in S is almost the same for an unbiased and a pro-business agent
is the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt. Biased delegation then does not nec-
improve on a rule for the principal (see point iii0 of proposition 3).
Notice that choosing a pro-business agent who replicates the
expected proﬁt under the welfare-maximizing rule always leads to
results than the rule but might not be the optimal strategy for the
al.
Notice that optimal biased delegation reproduces the optimal incentive-
ible contract the principal could offer to an unbiased agent.
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466 / Rule versus Discretion B. Pablo Montagnes and Stephane Woltoncipal’s policy preference from his choice of agent: Even a pro-
consumer principal (large aP) may appear pro-business (by
delegating to an agent with low aA).
Biased discretion may, however, be dominated by a rule
when available agents are either too dissimilar or too similar
to the principal as illustrated in ﬁgure 8.23 In the ﬁrst case,
the gain from an increased probability of investment does
not compensate for the loss from underregulation when the
degree of externality is high (Sp S). This result corresponds
to the well-known cost associated with drift in delegation
models (as a result, it extends naturally to the case in which
uncertainty is about how much the ﬁrm will be regulated).
In the second case, delegation does not buy enough ex ante
commitment power to induce a sufﬁciently large increase in
the probability of investment. The principal prefers biased dis-
cretion to the welfare-maximizing rule only when the set of
available agents is sufﬁciently rich.
This section establishes conditions under which the prin-
cipal prefers to delegate to a biased agent even if a clone of
herself is available and agents have no special expertise or
advantage over the principal. This reversal of the ally prin-
ciple is a consequence of the ﬁrm’s strategic responses to
regulation. In the absence of concerns about the economic
consequences of regulatory uncertainty, the principal would
always prefer delegation to an unbiased agent.23. In app. A, we provide simple conditions such that the principal
does not delegate to agents too biased in favor of business or too close to
herself (see corollaries A.1 and A.2).
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The previous section implicitly assumes that the principal
can commit to never replacing the agent. However, this
commitment may not be tenable since in many countries,
including the United States, the executive has the authority
to replace agency heads (e.g., Lewis 2008; but see Gailmard
and Patty [2012b, 236–37] for a discussion on the limits to
such authority).
After delegating to an optimally pro-business agent, the
principal never faces a commitment problem when the re-
alized degree of externality is low (Sp S), as both prefer no
regulation. In the high state (Sp S), in contrast, the biased
agent underregulates from the principal’s perspective. Since
investment has already been undertaken when the externality
is revealed to all players, the principal has an incentive to
replace the sitting bureaucrat with an agent with preferences
closer to her own unless the cost of doing so is sufﬁciently
high as illustrated in ﬁgure 9.24 With the likelihood that the
cost of investment is high, the principal must delegate to a
pro-business agent with preferences further away from her
own to induce investment with high probability. This in-
creases the temptation to replace the agent, and so credible
commitment requires that the minimum replacement cost
increase with the likelihood that the cost of investment is
high. Whenever the replacement cost is below this threshold,
the ﬁrm does not ﬁnd the principal’s commitment to a pro-Figure 6. Market equilibrium with different levels of regulation. A, Level of regulation with pro-business agent. B, Proﬁt with pro-business agent. The dashed
black line corresponds to the level of regulation and proﬁt with an unbiased agent and the solid line with a pro-business agent. Parameter values: kp 1, aPp
0.3, aA ≈ 0.067, and gp 0.4.24. Naturally, such a commitment problem never arises when the
regulatory uncertainty is about how much the ﬁrm will be regulated. The
principal can then delegate to an unbiased agent who always implements
her preferred policy.
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unbiased agent. In the absence of a sufﬁciently high cost of
replacing the agents, the principal may thus be unable to do
better than commit to a suboptimal rule as only a rule re-
solves both the ﬁrm’s ex ante regulatory uncertainty and the
principal’s ex post commitment problem.25
The reasoning above suggests that the principal might
be made better off if she can impose high replacement costs
on herself. Common replacement costs include life-long
tenure or ﬁxed-term appointments.26 In our setting, these
protections beneﬁt the principal by encouraging ﬁrm invest-
ment. Our rationale for civil service protections thus com-
plements previous explanations that focus on encouraging
investment in expertise (e.g., Gailmard and Patty 2007).
EXTENSIONS
In this section, we present a series of extensions to demon-
strate the robustness of our results. We ﬁrst show that the
welfare-maximizing rule may dominate unbiased delegation
when multiple ﬁrms can enter the market. We then return to
the case of a single potential entrant and demonstrate that
our results are robust if the principal can subsidize the ﬁrm.
Finally, we show that a rule can dominate discretion when
the principal seeks to avoid a ﬁrm exiting a market or when
the ﬁrm investment is welfare reducing.25. Commitment to a regulatory framework entails more credibility
than commitment to an agent since any modiﬁcation to the regulatory
framework—from rule to discretion or vice versa—often requires legis-
lative intervention (e.g., the Chevron doctrine in the United States).
26. Regulators appointed to ﬁxed terms can serve their full term
without the support of the president (Lewis 2004).
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We consider the situation in which at most N 1 1 ﬁrms can
enter the market. All ﬁrms face a common ﬁxed cost of en-
try, and when L ﬁrms enter the market (L ≤ N), they engage
in Cournot (quantity) competition.27 In line with the base-
line setup, we assume that the welfare-maximizing rule cho-
sen by the principal guarantees that all ﬁrms enter the mar-
ket.
As above, when choosing a level of regulation, an agent
trades off the mitigating effect of regulation on the exter-
nality with the costs in terms of ﬁrms’ proﬁts and consumer
surplus. Since the trade-offs are similar to those in the base-
line model, we ﬁnd that there exists a unique optimal level of
regulation for each degree of externality (S), and this level of
regulation is increasing and concave in S (ﬁg. 10).
The presence of multiple ﬁrms, however, has three im-
portant consequences. First, it increases the total quantity
produced, which worsens the negative impact of any degree
of externality. Second, it increases the consumer surplus
(higher quantity, lower price). Third, it decreases a ﬁrm’s
and the industry (total) proﬁt. These three effects have im-
portant implications for the choice of a level of regulation.
Since an increase in the level of regulation at ﬁrst has little
effect on the already low industry proﬁt, an agent who puts
a lot of weight on proﬁt relative to consumer surplus in his
welfare function chooses a level of regulation taking into
consideration mostly the negative impact of increased pro-
duction. Further, a pro-business agent may prefer to limitFigure 7. Delegation to a pro-business agent. The dashed lines correspond
to the proﬁt with an unbiased agent and the solid line to the proﬁt with a
biased agent. Parameter values: k p 1, aP p 0.3, aA ≈ 0.067, g p 0.4,
S p 0:01, S p 0:525, and q p 0.5.Figure 8. Principal’s welfare as a function of agent’s bias. The dashed black
line is the principal’s welfare under the welfare-maximizing rule and the
solid line under delegation to an agent with bias a. Parameter values:
k p 1, aP p 0.55, g p 0.4, S p 0:01, S p 0:24, q p 0.2,
.F(C)p (C 2 C )2=(C 2 C )2, C p 0:08, and C p p(Rule)≈0:098.27. For more details on the entry process, as well as all formal results
and proofs, see app. B.
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468 / Rule versus Discretion B. Pablo Montagnes and Stephane Woltonﬁrm entry because more entrants lead to decreased proﬁts
and increased costs associated with the externality. Inversely,
an agent who puts a lot of weight on consumer surplus
(which increases with the number of entrants) always wants
to encourage more entry. In addition, in choosing the level
of regulation, a pro-consumer agent balances the mitigating
effect with the cost for consumers as more regulation de-
creases quantity and increases price. Consequently, for a
sufﬁciently low degree of externality, a pro-consumer agent
regulates less than a pro-business agent as shown in ﬁgure 10.28
Figure 10 also highlights that for a very low degree of
externality, the optimal level of regulation is still zero. In
fact, as in the case of a monopoly, the agent in charge of
regulation would like to impose a negative level of regula-
tion but is otherwise constrained by the regulatory instru-
ment or other jurisdictions.29 Therefore, as long as the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt is decreasing with the level of regulation, the binding
lower bound on the optimal level of regulation implies that, as
in the baseline model, at low degrees of externality, a rule can
lead to higher proﬁt than delegation to an unbiased agent. This
is the case in ﬁgure 11A. A rule may then dominate unbiased
delegation since it increases the likelihood that a high number
of ﬁrms enter the market. Biased discretion may dominate
both since it gives the principal much of the ex ante commit-
ment power of a rule while limiting ex post inefﬁciencies. How-
ever, given that a pro-consumer agent tends to regulate less
than a pro-business agent for a low degree of externality, the28. Since regulation imposes a convex cost on ﬁrms, a pro-business
agent always regulates less than a pro-consumer agent for a high enough
degree of externality (see ﬁg. 10A).
29. By the reasoning above, this occurs whenever the agent puts
sufﬁciently high weight on the consumer surplus.
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms principal might strictly prefer to delegate to a pro-consumer
agent rather than a pro-business agent to increase the like-
lihood of entry. These results are summarized in proposi-
tion 4 and corollary 1.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the number of ﬁrms is
not too large (N ≤ 31 2k). Then the principal prefers
the welfare-maximizing rule to unbiased discretion
whenever the following conditions are satisﬁed:43.197.
and Coi. the principal is not too pro-business,
ii. the probability of investment under unbiased
discretion is sufﬁciently low,
iii. the lower degree of externality (S) is strictly less
than some bS(aP;N), and
iv. the upper degree of externality (S) is strictly
below some S(S;N) 1 bS(aP;N).Furthermore, there always exists a biased agent such
that the principal prefers biased delegation to the welfare-
maximizing rule when these conditions are satisﬁed
and
v. the upper degree of externality (S) is strictly
below bS(0;N).Corollary 1. The principal prefers to delegate to a
pro-consumer agent when conditions i–v described
in proposition 4 hold and, in addition,
vi. the number of ﬁrms is not too small (N ≥ 11
(2k=3)).Competition between entrants, however, also changes how
regulation affects ﬁrms’ proﬁt. By increasing the marginal
cost, an increase in the level of regulation increases the
equilibrium price and total cost. While a single ﬁrm beneﬁts
fully from the increase in price, it bears only a small portion
of the cost increase: regulation mitigates the effect of com-
petitive pressures on proﬁt. Consequently, when the num-
ber of ﬁrms is large, proﬁt increases with the level of regu-
lation at low levels of regulation and, hence, low degrees of
externality. However, as the cost of regulation is convex for
ﬁrms, at high levels of regulation (high degrees of exter-
nality), proﬁt always decreases with the level of regulation
(with S). A ﬁrm’s proﬁt thus exhibits an inverse U-shaped
relationship with respect to the degree of externality. ForFigure 9. Minimum replacement cost required for credible commitment to
a pro-business agent as a function of C. Parameter values: k p 1, aP p
0.55, gp 0.4, S p 0:01, S p 0:24, qp 0.2, F(C)p (C 2 C )=(C 2 C ),
and C p 0:085.008 on May 16, 2017 03:38:09 AM
nditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 79 Number 2 April 2017 / 469intermediary degrees of externality—meaning when the
uncertainty is about how much the ﬁrm will be regulated—
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is then always strictly lower under unbiased
discretion than under the welfare-maximizing rule (ﬁg. 11B),
and the principal may prefer the rule.30
Proposition 5. Suppose that the number of ﬁrms is
large (N 1 31 2k). Then the principal prefers the
welfare-maximizing rule to unbiased discretion when-
ever the following conditions are satisﬁed:30.
ﬁrm w
underr
the bas
inefﬁci
the pri
be opt
agent m
compei. the principal is not too pro-business,
ii. the probability of investment under unbiased
discretion is sufﬁciently low,
iii. the lower degree of externality (S) is between
some Sm(aP;N) and some Sp(aP;N), and
iv. the upper degree of externality (S) is between
Sp(aP;N) and some SM(S;aP ,N)).Introducing competition between entrants does not alter
our main results. As for a monopoly, we identify circum-
stances under which the gain from ex ante commitmentNotice that because uncertainty centers around how much the
ill be regulated, delegating to a biased agent always induces over- or
egulation from the principal’s perspective. As such—in contrast to
eline model—biased delegation does not necessarily limit ex post
encies, and a rule-based regulatory framework can be optimal for
ncipal. This suggests that rule-based regulatory frameworks might
imal for very competitive industries, while discretion to a biased
ight be optimal for industries exhibiting a relatively low level of
tition. A full characterization of this result is left for future research.
This content downloaded from 158.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms power outweighs the loss from ex post inefﬁciency, and the
principal prefers a rule-based regulatory framework. She
may also sometimes prefer to delegate to a biased agent (who
may be pro-consumer). Since the introduction of competi-
tion only complicates the analysis, we return to the case of a
single ﬁrm in what follows.
Subsidy
When technical and institutional constraints prevent an
agent from achieving the unconstrained (i.e., negative) ﬁrst-
best level of regulation and encouraging production in low
states, the welfare-maximizing rule can dominate unbiased
discretion. Subsidies circumvent the lower bound on regu-
lation. However, subsidies are an imperfect substitute for
negative regulation, and the principal may still prefer a rule
to delegation to an unbiased agent.
Adhering to the baseline setup, we assume that the gov-
ernment can offer a cost subsidy I that acts analogously to
negative regulation. With cost subsidy I and level of regu-
lation R, the ﬁrm’s production cost is C(Q;R, I)p Q2=(12
R1 I). Subsidies must be ﬁnanced by taxation. Because taxes
generate distortions in other sectors, the cost of subsidies
does not depend on the degree of externality. This last
property turns out to be essential to our results. We assume
that the cost of subsidy is v(I)Q with v(⋅) increasing and
strictly convex.31 The timing remains the same. Under a rule-Figure 10. Optimal level of regulation with multiple ﬁrms. A, Three ﬁrms; B, 15 ﬁrms. The solid line corresponds to the optimal level of regulation for the
principal, the dashed line to the optimal level of regulation for a pro-business agent, and the dotted line to the optimal level of regulation for a pro-consumer
agent. Parameter values: k p 1, g p 0.4, aP p 0.3, pro-business agent aA p 0.2, and pro-consumer agent aA p 0.54.31. We also impose additional technical assumptions on v(⋅) to fa-
cilitate the analysis. For details, see app. B.2. Importantly, our key insights
hold when speciﬁc assumptions on the effect and cost of the subsidy are
relaxed.
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470 / Rule versus Discretion B. Pablo Montagnes and Stephane Woltonbased regulatory framework, both regulation and subsidy are
chosen prior to the ﬁrm investment, whereas they are both
decided after the degree of externality is revealed under dis-
cretion.
Both negative regulation (if feasible) and subsidies en-
courage production. However, they differ in their costs. The
cost of negative regulation (R ! 0) is gSQ1 gS(2R)Q. The
cost of a subsidy is gSQ1 v(I)Q. The ﬁrst term in both
corresponds to the unmitigated cost of the externality, whereas
the second term corresponds to the direct cost of negative
regulation or subsidy. For negative regulation, this direct cost
is a function of the degree of externality. It goes to zero as the
degree of externality goes to zero.32 In contrast, the direct cost
of subsidy remains strictly positive even as S approaches zero.
Thus, for a very low degree of externality, the costs of repro-
ducing the unconstrained ﬁrst-best negative level of regu-
lation are too high relative to the beneﬁt. Consequently, the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt with subsidy exhibits a kink, which implies it is
concave over a range of degrees of externality (see ﬁg. 12B
for an illustration). We can then apply the same reasoning
as above to establish that the welfare-maximizing rule can
dominate discretion when the states (S and S) are in this
range. We thus obtain proposition 6, which formally extends
our key result to an environment with subsidies.
Proposition 6. When subsidies are available, the prin-
cipal prefers the welfare-maximizing rule to unbiased
discretion whenever the following conditions are sat-
isﬁed:32. The combined direct and indirect cost of negative regulation
(whenever feasible) even goes to zero as S goes to zero in equilibrium
(details available on request).
33.
schedu
ment b
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Coi. the probability of investment under unbiased
discretion is sufﬁciently low,
ii. the lower degree of externality (S) is strictly less
than some bSI(aP), and
iii. the upper degree of externality (S) is strictly
below some SI(S;aP) 1 bSI(aP).A common alternative to a cost subsidy is an investment
subsidy: a lump-sum payment to the ﬁrm conditional on in-
vestment.33 An investment subsidy does not affect produc-
tion, but it mitigates the costs associated with regulatory
uncertainty and increases the likelihood of ﬁrm entry. How-
ever, as before, ﬁnancing the subsidy imposes distortionary
costs, and if these costs are sufﬁciently high, the welfare-
maximizing rule (which always induces investment in the
absence of subsidy) dominates unbiased discretion. Further-
more, if the optimal investment subsidy fails to guarantee in-
vestment with probability one, the principal always prefers del-
egating to a biased rather than unbiased agent (see app. B.2
for more details).
Avoiding exit
Our main results still hold when the ﬁrm must decide
whether to stay or exit the market and allocate its capital to
new activities that provide a proﬁt PO 1 0 (possibly revealed
after the regulatory framework is established). In this case,
the principal’s choice of a regulatory framework must take
into account the ﬁrm’s disinvestment decision. If the degree
of externality changes over time and the nature of regulatoryFigure 11. A ﬁrm’s proﬁt under different regulatory frameworks. A, Three ﬁrms; B, 15 ﬁrms. Parameter values: k p 1, g p 0.4, aP p 0.3, q p 0.4; for
ﬁgure 11A, S p 0:01 and S p 0:5; for ﬁgure 11B, S p 0:2 and Sp 1:4.Investment subsidies often take the form of sped-up depreciation
les. Shorter depreciation schedules reduce the net cost of invest-
y bringing forward tax savings.
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ulated, the logic outlined above predicts that there exist
circumstances under which the principal prefers the welfare-
maximizing rule to unbiased discretion.34
The threat of exit, however, depends on the nature of the
capital investment. If the ﬁrm cannot easily liquidate its
capital, this threat is low, and the principal can delegate to an
unbiased (or almost unbiased) agent. In contrast, if the ﬁrm
can move its capital at a low cost, the principal may prefer a
rule-based regulatory framework or delegation to a pro-
business agent. Consequently, our theory predicts that both
the regulatory framework and the political orientation of
regulatory agencies should depend on the nature of the ﬁrm’s
investment. Similarly, our theoretical results suggest that
economic domains marked by a high level of jurisdictional
competition should be associated with a lower level of reg-
ulation (also termed “the race to the bottom”; Oates 1972) as
well as a greater adoption of an ex post inefﬁcient regulatory
framework.
Welfare-reducing investment
Rules can also dominate discretion when the principal ex
ante prefers the ﬁrm to allocate resources to other sectors.
This occurs when the principal gets higher expected utility
from investment in other sectors or when there is a ﬁxed cost
for the principal associated with investment, such as systemic
risk induced by investment in risky derivatives or environ-
mental risk associated with a new pipeline.34. A similar result holds when the ﬁrm is uncertain whether it will
face new regulation in a second dimension.
This content downloaded from 158.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms To discourage investment, the principal may prefer a rule
that guarantees a very low proﬁt. The principal can also
choose to delegate to a sufﬁciently pro-consumer agent who
always regulates more than the principal (conditional on
investment) and prevents the ﬁrm from entering the market.
In contrast to our previous results, the principal is never
strictly better off by delegating to a pro-consumer agent than
by imposing a rule. In both cases, investment is discour-
aged, and the principal obtains the utility from her outside
option.
CONCLUSION
This article studies how the downstream economic conse-
quences of regulation shape the regulatory framework and
the preferences of agents in charge of it. Because regulatory
uncertainty affects ﬁrms’ investment, a principal faces a
trade-off between ex ante commitment provided by a rule
and the ex post efﬁciency provided by unbiased discretion.
When uncertainty is about whether the ﬁrm will be regulated
and the cost of investment is likely to be high, the gain from
commitment outweighs the loss from efﬁciency: The prin-
cipal chooses a rule over unbiased discretion. She may, how-
ever, prefer delegation to a pro-business agent to both, as
biased delegation guarantees investment with a high prob-
ability without inducing a large loss in terms of ex post ef-
ﬁciency. Our model thus predicts that even pro-consumer
principals may sometimes appear as if they favor busi-
nesses.
Biased delegation requires additional commitment and is
feasible only when it is costly for the principal to replace the
agent. Without this replacement cost, the principal might be
forced to choose an inefﬁcient rule-based regulatory frame-Figure 12. Regulation, subsidy, and proﬁt as a function of the degree of externality. A, Levels of regulation (solid line) and subsidy (dashed line); B, proﬁt.
Parameter values: k p 1, g p 0.4, and aP p 0.3.43.197.008 on May 16, 2017 03:38:09 AM
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472 / Rule versus Discretion B. Pablo Montagnes and Stephane Woltonwork. The principal is then made better off by restricting her
ability to replace agents by, for example, offering life-long
tenure to agents. Our theory thus suggests that civil service
protections may be about commitment to regulated parties
as much as internal concerns regarding investment in ex-
pertise.
Our conclusions highlight that the internal organization
of the bureaucracy does not depend only on the presence of
uncertainty about the effects of regulation, but also on how
ﬁrms strategically respond to different regulatory frame-
works. Firms can have a strong inﬂuence on the bureaucratic
structure even without any sort of lobbying. Empirical studies
that fail to account for the indirect effects we identify are
bound to yield biased estimates of ﬁrms’ direct inﬂuence in the
rule-making process.
To facilitate comparisons with existing models of the
bureaucracy, we have focused on a static game. However, the
regulatory framework evolves over time. This can be due, for
example, to a delay in precisely evaluating the degree of ex-
ternality generated by the ﬁrm. How this discovery problem
and other dynamic features of the relationship between ﬁrms
and agencies affect the internal structure of the bureaucracy
is a promising avenue for future research.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Alexandra Cirone, Anthony Fowler, Sean Gail-
mard, Joshua Strayhorn, and conference participants at the
Midwest Political Science Association, the American Po-
litical Science Association, and the Southern Political Sci-
ence Association. We also thank our anonymous reviewers
for their feedback. All remaining errors are the authors’ re-
sponsibility.REFERENCES
Athey, Susan, Andrew Atkeson, and Patrick J. Kehoe. 2005. “The Optimal
Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy.” Econometrica 73 (5): 1431–75.
Bendor, Jonathan, Amihai Glazer, and Thomas Hammond. 2001. “The-
ories of Delegation.” Annual Review of Political Science 4:235–69.
Bendor, Jonathan, and Adam Meirowitz. 2004. “Spatial Models of Dele-
gation.” American Political Science Review 98 (2): 293–310.This content downloaded from 158.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Boehmke, Frederick J., Sean Gailmard, and John Wiggs Patty. 2006.
“Whose Ear to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy
Making.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1 (2): 139–69.
Carpenter, Daniel, and Michael M. Ting. 2007. “Regulatory Errors with
Endogenous Agendas.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (4):
835–52.
Crain, Nicole V., and W. Mark Crain. 2010. “The Regulation Tax Keeps
Growing.” Wall Street Journal, September 27.
Dewatripont, Mathias, and Jean Tirole. 1999. “Advocates.” Journal of Political
Economy 107 (1): 1–39.
Epstein, David, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1994. “Administrative Procedures,
Information, and Agency Discretion.” American Journal of Political
Science 38:697–722.
Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2007. “Slackers and Zealots: Civil Ser-
vice, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise.” American Journal of
Political Science 51 (4): 873–89.
Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2012a. “Formal Models of Bureau-
cracy.” Annual Review of Political Science 15:353–77.
Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2012b. Learning While Governing:
Expertise andAccountability in the Executive Branch. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Gailmard, Sean, and John W. Patty. 2013. “Giving Advice vs. Making
Decisions: Transparency, Information, and Delegation.” Presented at
the Becker-Friedman Institute Conference on Constitutional Design
and the Scope of Authority, University of Chicago.
Gordon, Sanford C., and Catherine Hafer. 2007. “Corporate Inﬂuence and
the Regulatory Mandate.” Journal of Politics 69 (2): 300–319.
Hoffmann, Volker H., Thomas Trautmann, and Jens Hamprecht. 2009.
“Regulatory Uncertainty: A Reason to Postpone Investments? Not
Necessarily.” Journal of Management Studies 46 (7): 1227–53.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole. 1993. A Theory of Incentives in
Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lewis, David E. 2004. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political
Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946–1997.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Lewis, David E. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political
Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
McCarty, Nolan. 2013. “The Regulation and Self-Regulation of a Complex
Industry.” Unpublished manuscript, Princeton University.
Milliken, Frances J. 1987. “Three Types of Perceived Uncertainty about
the Environment: State, Effect, and Response Uncertainty.” Academy
of Management Review 12 (1): 133–43.
Moe, Terry M. 2012. “Delegation, Control, and the Study of Public Bureau-
cracy.” Forum 10 (2): 1–45.
Oates, Wallace E. 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich.
Pindyck, Robert S. 1991. “Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment.”
Journal of Economic Literature 29:1110–48.43.197.008 on May 16, 2017 03:38:09 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
